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PREFACE 
The ancient Greeks, their accomplishments, and their 
history have always facinated me. Further studies into 
Greek history developed an interest in the Spartans and 
their activities. So many of the ancient authors are if 
not openly, at least covertly, hostile to the Spartans. 
Many of the modern works are concerned only with the early 
or late history or are general surveys of the total 
history of Sparta while few works consider Sparta separate 
from the other Greek city-states in the classical period. 
My intention is to examine the role of the commoner 
in ancient Sparta. It must be emphasized that the use of 
"commoner" in this text refers to the Spartan citizens who 
were not kings. The Spartan slaves and other non-citizen 
groups are not included in the classification of 
commoners. This examination considers the lifestyle of 
the commoner, his various roles in the government, the 
better-known commoners, and the various conflicts which 
arose between the kings and the commoners. This work will 
not reveal any startling new information. It is rather a 
different approach to viewing Spartan history based on the 
Spartan commoner and his position in his society. 
iii 
I wish to thank my thesis adviser, Dr. Neil 
Hackett, for all of his patience, understanding, guidance, 
and assistance. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable 
assistance of Dr. John Paul Bischoff reguarding comments 
on stylistic matters. The final member of the committee, 
Dr. James Henderson, I also thank for his help in the 
preparation and completion of this thesis. 
I owe my husband Sa'adeh and my parents more than I 
can possibly describe for their understanding and support 
during the course of this work. I also owe a debt of 
thanks to Mrs. Kathleen Chambers and her daughter Anne-
Marie Webster for helping me to discover that history was 
the field for me. I thank the rest of my relatives and 
friends for their encouragement and support throughout 
this endeavor. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Spartan commoners, the Spartiates, had a major 
influence upon the making of Sparta; however, most 
studies do not dwell upon their contributions but 
concentrate instead upon the kings and other outstanding 
heroes of Spartan history. Sparta had a dual monarchy, 
but her governing constitution did not give sole power of 
rule to the kings. The constitution allowed the 
commoners of Sparta to be of major influence and 
importance in the events and history of the Spartan 
state. Commoners had roles as significant as those of 
the kings and in many instances, as will be seen 
throughout this paper, the Spartan commoners' role was 
more important. The term "commoner" refers to those 
persons who were male citizens of Sparta (Spartiates) but-
were not kings. In the classical period of Greek history 
wealth was not a factor in determining the role of the 
commoner in the Spartan system. The only importance 
wealth had was in making the commoner a citizen of the 
polis through the continued payment of his public mess 
dues. The Spartan commoners held high positions in the 
government, some of which could limit or direct the 
1 
2 
activities of the kings. Commoners were a significant 
part of the military and, like Lysander, were 
responsible for many developments in the other Greek city-
states. The great importance of the nonroyal citizens in 
Spartan history requires a detailed consideration of them 
and their activities. 
A discussion of the ancient sources is necessary to 
reveal the validity, biases, and shortcomings of the 
materials available for research on ancient Sparta. The 
primary source materials for the period under discussion 
in this paper are not satisfactory on all aspects of 
Spartan history. In general, the writers of the ancient 
works were often inaccurate. They ignored, glossed over, 
or otherwise distorted many facts. 
Except for a few fragmentary remains of the poems of 
Aleman and Tyrtaeus the first sources for early Spartan 
history are in the work of the historian Herodotus, who 
wrote about the events of Greece before the prejudice of 
the Athenians and Athenian idealization after the 
Peloponnesian War produced serious distortions in Greek 
1 
and Spartan history. Herodotus' histories covered the 
2 
period of the Persian Wars, from 499 to 479 B. c., and 
the history of Persia and Greece before the wars. 
Although he distinctly prefers the Greeks over the 
Persians and greatly admires Athens, Herodotus is 
relatively free of bias for either Athens or Sparta over 
the other because he 1..ras born in Halicarnassus. 
Herodotus' work shows that he is not greatly concerned 
with detailed chronology. He does use literary sources, 
personal accounts which are biased in themselves, and 
whatever other sources he found. These materials he 
supplemented and verified through the use of inquiry and 
3 
common sense. Herodotus states more than one view on a 
particular issue and then justifies the view he considers 
to be the more accurate option, but he does not insist 
that the more probable had to be true and the other views 
wrong. Later writers hav~ questioned Herodotus' 
statistics, especially concerning the numbers of dead 
4 
after the various battle and campaigns. Even with such 
a fault, Herodotus is a valuable source of information on 
Sparta. 
Thucydides' histories are the next important 
contemporary source for the history of Sparta. The work 
covers the Peloponnesian War from 431 to 411 plus a 
consideration of the Athenian expansion before the war. 
While Herodotus' work is sometimes referred to as a 
5 
collection of "entertaining tales of the romantic past," 
Thucydides is more interested in giving an exact, 
accurate account of his own time. Thucydides, who was an 
Athenian, admires Pericles and Periclean Athens. At the 
same time, some of his hostility towards Athens, 
resulting from his banishment from the city after he lost 
to Brasidas at Amphipolis, is also apparent in the work. 
3 
However, for the most part Thucydid~s writes with great 
6 
impartiality. He is the source of much of the 
information about the Spartan commoners Brasidas, 
Lysander, and others who will be considered in greater 
7 
detail later. Although Thucydides was contemporary to 
the events he wrote about, his reconstruction of that 
history should not be taken as the total truth, but 
rather as a rationalization of the events. Even 
Thucydides could not be everywhere at once and had to 
rely upon witnesses who could very well have distorted 
the events intentionally or not. 
Xenophon is the third historian of significant value 
for the reconstruction of Spartan history. He began his 
work by continuing where Thucydides had stopped his 
writings in 411 B. c. and from there, Xenophon provided a 
discourse on Greek events to 362 B. c. He details the 
end of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan hegemony, and 
the loss of the Spartan supremacy to the Thebans. His 
work on the great Spartan king of that period, 
Agesilaus II, shows even more strongly than in his 
Hellenica Xenophon•s partiality towards the Spartans. 
Xenophon was an Athenian but his sympathies were in the 
Spartan camp where he had spent most of his adult life. 
His work, Lacedaemonian Politics, is of great importance 
for information on Spartan political institutions and the 
constitution. Xenophon•s works are not of the same 
historical quality as those of Thucydides because there 
4 
is little analysis of political development. Xenophon 
was contemporary to the events of his narrative which is 
why many historians prefer his material over that of 
8 
later writers, but he frequently omits material which 
showed Sparta's failures or damaged her character. In 
later historical documents of other chroniclers writing 
about the period 411 to 362 are discussions of many of 
Spartan's problems and defeats. Xenophon's organization 
is also difficult to traverse and to reconstruct a 
chronological pattern of events. He dislikes the Thebans 
and is impartial towards Athens, while excusing Sparta's 
defeats and ignoring her humiliations. 
The unknown historian, most commonly designated as 
"P", wrote the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia which discusses the 
same period as Xenophon's history. P's work includes 
many items not found in Xenophon and seems to be the 
9 
major source for the later historian Ephorus. P's works 
exist mainly in a fragmentary state and what is extensive 
(covering the ye,ars 396 and 395) has not yet been 
translated into a modern language in its entirety. The 
identification of this historian has been equated with 
Theopompus, Cratippus, and Daimachus, but many modern 
scholars hold that the historian is still unknown to 
10 
present researchers. 
The last major sources contemporary to the time 
period being examined are the works of the philosopher 
Aristotle. His works are partly scientific treatises and 
5 
partly works on philosophical subjects. Aristotle's work 
on the politics of many different Greek city-states is 
important for details of Spartan customs and government. 
Aristotle, who was not an historian but rather a 
constitutionalist, is anti-Spartan in his criticisms of 
Spartan institutions and Spartan aims~ because of this he 
should not to be accepted as entirely accurate on the 
matters of Spartan life and law. Although Aristotle 
criticizes various aspects of the Spartan political 
system, his ideal political system contains several 
aspects from the Spartan device, so obviously he does not 
11 
consider everything about Sparta to be ill-conceived. 
A writer of importance whose works have not survived 
the passage of time is Ephorus of Cyme in Asia Minor. 
His History, a leading source for Diodorus Siculus' 
Lives, covers the period from the Dorian invasions to the 
12 
siege of Perinthus in 340. Ephorus' work is an 
episodic history divided into geographical areas where 
more details are available. The work of Ephorus may be 
lost but it is known that he presents a tradition apart 
from that of Xenophon and that he is not as pro-Spartan 
as Xenophon. 
An ancient source, but not contemporary with the 
Spartan hegemony is Diodorus of Sicily, who is of great 
importance because he relied upon the historian Ephorus 
for much of his information for the fourth and fifth 
centuries. Diodorus' work is intended to be a 
6 
compilation of history from the beginning of Greek 
history, which for him was in 1184 with the Trojan Wars, 
until the year 59. The work was to be a total world 
history, at least as far as the world was then 
recognized, and not confined just to Greece and Rome. 
Much of Diodorus• forty books exist only in fragments 
mentioned in later works, but the books which cover 
history from 480 to 302 are extant and are informative 
for the study of Spartan history. Because of his 
lateness (he wrote in the first century of the Roman 
period) many historians and writers prefer Xenophon to 
Diodorus when the two conflict. More recent authors such 
13 14 
as Rice and Hornblower emphatically state that the 
account of Diodorus should not be dismissed merely 
because it does not agree with Xenophon and that the 
former offers an anti-Spartan tradition, but should be 
used carefully to correct and supplement Xenophon. 
Diodorus• account is merely a summary of historical 
events which others had already written about in greater 
15 
detail. Diodorus moralizes on various activities of 
the people involved but does not analyze, as does 
Thucydides, the political reasons behind the events. 
The last primary sources of importance for ancient 
Spartan history are the works of Plutarch, who lived in 
the second century A. D. The most vital works of 
Plutarch are his biographies of major Greek and Roman 
figures. Like Diodorus, Plutarch's writings are only as 
7 
valuable as the sources upon which the author relies. He 
also represents a tradition different from Xenophon and a 
~ 
rather anti-Spartan point of view. 
The other ancient materials, generally have pro-
Athenian, anti-Spartan tendencies and are not as 
informative as the sources already discussed. After the 
Thebans defeated Sparta at Leuctra in 371 and destroyed 
Sparta's hegemony, ancient writers had very little more 
to say about the Spartans until the middle of the third 
century. Most of the histories contemporary with the 
period 362 to 323 have not survived in their entirety. 
Only fragments of the writings by Ephorus, Theopompus, 
and others survive in the quotations of writers of the 
Roman period. 
The time period which this thesis covers is limited 
to the span of time between the Lycurgan reforms and the 
death of Alexander. The reasons for this are several. 
The main reason for examining the period after the 
Lycurgan reforms rather than before, is the availability 
and trustworthyness of sources. The Lycurgan reforms 
were governmental reforms made sometime between the ninth 
and sixth centuries. The use of the date 776 is based 
16 
upon Aristotle, who dated the reforms with the 
occurrence of the first Olympiad. Another reason for the 
date is because of the fact that a reform of the Spartan 
government in the ninth century seems to be extremely 
early considering the limited amount of political 
8 
development in other Greek city-states while the sixth 
too late. The reforms probably took place between the 
eighth and seventh centuries after the turmoil of the 
17 
first and second Messenian Wars. The Spartan state 
embarked upon these wars mainly to obtain and consolidate 
18 
more nearby territory. The Spartan reforms were named 
for Lycurgus, a figure who seems to be half legendary and 
half real. Most modern historians accept that there was 
indeed a man named Lycurgus but doubt that Lycurgus could 
19 
be responsible for all of the reforms credited to him. 
Most writers believe that the Lycurgan reforms evolved 
20 
over a long span of time and that it was not until the 
fifth century that ancient Spartans credited Lycurgus 
21 
with their manufacture. The individual arguments 
about Lycurgus and the reforms go beyond the scope of 
this paper but the way of life dictated by the Lycurgan 
reforms in the Spartan Rhetra (constitution) will be 
considered later. 
The decision to end the discussion of the Spartan 
commoner in 323 results from the change in polity in 
24 
Greece after Alexander's death and the continued 
decline of Sparta and her role in Greek affairs, a 
decline which began with the defeat at Leuctra. There 
are sources which consider Sparta in the middle of the 
25 
third century and in the second, but Sparta was unable 
to break out of her decline and became just another minor 
city in the vast Roman empire. 
9 
The consideration of the commoner and his importance 
to Sparta will center around his lifestyle, the types of 
governmental role he could hold, and conflicts (both real 
and assumed) with the Spartan kings. Those commoners 
which the ancient writers consider to be more outstanding 
than the majority will also be examined. Discussions 
will be made on the classification of the Lacedaemonians 
and on the decline in the number of the Spartan citizens. 
Throughout it will be shown that Spartan commoners held 
extremely important positions in the Spartan government 
and its history because of which the Spartan commoners 
deserve special examination. 
10 
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CHAPTER II 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF LACEDAEMONIANS 
There were several classifications in Spartan society 
other than that of the Spartiates to which the commoners 
belonged. The different groups influenced the lifestyle 
and activities. An examination of the Spartan estates is 
significant for a more concise understanding of Spartan 
commoners and their activities. The classifications of 
Lacedaemonians in addition to the citizens, the 
Spartiates, were those of the perioeci, helots, 
hypomeiones, neodamodeis, and mothakes. 
The Spartiates claimed to be descended from the 
original Dorians who conquered the area which formed 
1 
Sparta. The Spartiates were full Spartan citizens and in 
order to qualify for citizenship, a person had to have a 
Spartan citizen father and mother. An additional 
requirement was the possession of a kleros or a piece of 
land which the state allotted to him. Another condition 
for citizenship was the successful completion of the state 
2 
regulated educational system. All Spartan citizens were 
3 
considered homoioi or equals. This meant that each 
Spartiate had an equal standing in the eyes of the law and 
4 
an equal claim to the rights the state gave its citizens. 
13 
The Spartan citizen had an equal chance of holding most 
offices, although capability or popularity may have been 
factors in the elections. Spartiates were, in general, 
5 
the office holding group of Sparta. The use of the term 
homoioi implies that since all were equal there could 
not have been an exclusive nobility among of Spartan 
6 
citizens. 
14 
The possession of land was a very important factor in 
being a Spartiate. The kleros supported the Spartiate and 
was his means of making his monthly contributions to the 
eating halls. The loss of property, which occurred in 
Sparta increasingly after the Peloponnesian War and then 
after the end of the Spartan hegemony, caused numerous 
Spartans to lose many of the rights as citizens. The ex-
Spartiates then sank into the order of inferiors known as 
7 
the hypomeiones. The Spartan constitution, the Rhetra, 
prevented the sale of the kleros, but this restraint was 
8 
removed sometime in the fourth century and led to an 
aristocracy of people who were rich enough to buy up these 
lands or forclose on lands whose owners were unable to pay 
9 
back their debts. The condition which changed the kleros 
from an allotment to individuals by the state into a 
freehold property was blamed on the loss of Messenia in 
10 
370/369. Entrance to the Spartiate class by non-
Spartiates was rare because members jealously guarded 
their status. There were exceptions but these were few 
indeed. 
15 
The next group of people were the perioeci. They, 
like the Spartiates, owed military service to the state 
and ancient sources often lumped both groups together when 
11 
using the term "Lacedaemonians". The perioeci were 
probably the inhabitants of the area when the Dorians 
12 
first arrived in Laconia. The Dorians subjugated the 
perioec~ to the degree that they had no rights of 
participation in the Spartan government nor any voice in 
the decisions of foreign policy which might affect them. 
The perioeci were more or less under the control of the 
Spartiates. However, since most of them lived in small 
villages surrounding Sparta, the citizens allowed the 
perioeci to administer their internal affairs under the 
13 
guidance of a Spartiate called a harmost. Thus they 
were not slaves but were free people without citizenship. 
The perioeci do not seem to have been an oppressed 
section of the population. They showed few signs of being 
14 
discontented with their position. The towns of the 
perioeci were the seats of industry and trade. Because 
such occupations as artisan or merchant were forbidden to 
the Spartiates, the perioeci took over these professions 
and could become fairly wealthy from their profits in 
15 
these jobs. Yet, the majority were farmers and as such 
had only a modest income. 
The third major division of people at Sparta were the 
helots. For the most part they were the conquered peoples 
of Hessenia which Sparta subdued by the end of the fifth 
16 
century. There were probably in addition to the Messenian 
16 
helots many Laconian helots. The helots were slaves of 
the state. The state allotted these slaves to the 
Spartiates to work the kleroi. The Spartiates could not 
sell or trade the helots, only the state could do this. 
Thus the helots were not strictly property as were most 
slaves in ancient Greece. 
Because they numbered far more than the Spartiates 
and resented their position, the helots were a constant 
source of trouble for the Spartan citizenry. Aristotle 
reports that the helots repeatedly rose up against the 
17 
Spartiates. Athenaeus records that the Spartiates 
18 
treated the helots with great insolence which could 
account for much of the helot's hostility. Thucydides and 
Herodotus mention instances which indicated the extent 
Spartan fear of the possibility of helot revolt. One such 
case was the existence of the crypteia during which the 
magistrates sent out Spartan youths on certain occassions 
19 
to kill any helot they met. This along with the 
disappearance and assumed murder of 2,000 helots during 
20 
the Peloponnesian War suggest how the Spartiate 
attempted to control the rebellious helots. Another method 
of removing the threat posed by the helots was a formal 
declaration of war upon the helots which the ephors issued 
21 
upon entry of their office. Dio Chrystom and Aristotle 
imply that because the helots had no prospect of ever 
becoming Spartan citizens helots were constantly plotting 
22 
against the Spartiates. Thus a strained situation 
existed between helots and Spartiates until Messenia 
became an independent polis again. 
Upon rare occasion the helots were given freedom and 
became members of a separate class--that of the 
neodamodeis. Diodorus speaks of 1,000 helots who served 
with Brasidas in Thrace and because of their bravery and 
deeds, the Spartan government subsequently granted these 
23 
men their freedom in 421. It is most probable that 
those helots freed due to military service were Laconian 
24 
17 
helots, not Messenian, because of the fear on the behalf 
of the Spartiates that the Messenian helots would rise up 
and, with the help of those helots who had managed to 
escape from Laconia, attempt to overthrow the Spartiate 
25 
control. The helots made an effort in 464 after a great 
earthquake destroyed much of Sparta. The citizens subdued 
the revolt but did not put an end to fears of another 
uprising, nor did they totally suppress the Messenian 
26 
helots. In the helot rebellion only two of the many 
perioecic townships sided with the helots. Appa~t from 
the incident in 464, the perioeci did not show any further 
hostility towards the ruling class until of Cinadon's 
27 
conspiracy in 398. 
Because the Messenian helots did not quietly submit 
to the Spartiates, the citizens had to organize themselves 
and became a state of professional soldiers who were 
28 
constantly ready for rebellion. A major revolt in the 
seventh century had caused the implementation of a strict 
29 
military disciplinary system, the agoge. For the most 
part, fear and hatred on both sides was the relationship 
between Spartiates and helots. 
Beneath the Spartiates were several groups of 
inferiors who were jealous of the Spartiate's social 
prestige. These inferiors were freedmen but did not 
30 
possess the full rights of citizenship. The 
aforementioned hypomeiones had once been citizens but had 
lost their citizenship when they lost their kleros and 
were no longer able to pay the dues of the syssitia, the 
31 
common mess. Since hypomeiones no longer owned land, 
18 
they lived by occasional labor and probably engaged in the 
different crafts which the constitution forbidden to the 
32 
Spartiates. The hypomeiones were politically unhappy 
and ranged themselves on the side of the helots and 
33 
perioeci. One such person was Cinadon who attempted in 
34 
398 to overthrow the domination of the Spartiates. An 
informer told the ephors of the plot, and the citizens who 
were then able to prevent Cinadon's plan from maturing. 
The failure of the plot resulted in the deaths of Cinadon 
35 
and his associates. 
The neodamodeis were a classification of freed former 
slaves. They most often were those helots who gained their 
36 
freedom from service in the army as hoplites. 
19 
Hypomeiones and neodamodeis served in the army in the same 
37 
fashion as Spartiates and perioeci. The number of 
neodamodeis must have been considerable because King 
Agesilaus took some two thousand with him to Asia when he 
38 
was fighting the Persians. The neodamodeis probably 
never reached the status of homoioi because of the latent 
Spartan fear of the helots. 
In addition to the neodamodeis and hypomeiones was 
the group, the tresantes. These were men who returned to 
Sparta after being defeated in a war or who showed 
39 
cowardice in battle. They lost their eligibility for 
public office and lost control over their land. Lycurgus• 
Rhetra required the people to choose an honorable death 
40 
over a disgraceful life. The rest of the Spartans 
treated the tresantes with contempt. In some cases the 
ephors and the assembly reversed the status and the 
41 
tresantes became full citizens again. 
Mothakes were yet another classification of freedmen. 
They were not homoioi, did not receive a kleros, and were 
not eligible to be members of the Ecclesia, the Spartan 
assembly; but, they were subject to the hardships of the 
42 
Spartan agoge. Mothakes were the sons of helot women 
and probably had Spartiate fathers. Brought up as foster 
brothers to young Spartans citizens, the mothakes 
participated along side their foster brothers in the 
43 
discipline training in order to become good soldiers. 
Some mothakes were actually promoted to the status of 
citizens, but this only occurred through very unusual 
44 
circumstances. Lysander was one mothake to whom the 
20 
Spartan state granted citizenship in 405 in recognition of 
45 
merit during the Peloponnesian War. Whether Lysander 
was really a mothake or a Spartiate is greatly disputed in 
both ancient and modern works and his case may have been 
46 
unusual. Promotion to Spartiate was more exceptional 
47 
than demotion down to hypomeion status. 
The emergence of the neodamodeis proved how accute 
was the problem of the decline in the number of 
Spartiates. Even as early as the Peloponnesian Wars, the 
use of freed helots as a regular segment of the Spartan 
military system revealed the shortage of man power 
available for fighting in major wars. With mistrust and 
hatred on both sides, the Spartiates must have needed 
large numbers of loyal fighting men for the state to go so 
48 
far as to arm, train, and liberate slaves. The hiring 
of mercenary troops apparently increased greatly during 
49 
and after the reign of Agesilaus II. Freed slaves and 
mercenaries came to constitute the majority of the armed 
hoplite troops. The Spartan citizens were employed in the 
states administration system or in army command positions. 
Just what the numbers of each of the three major 
classifications (helots, perioeci, and Spartiates) were at 
the time of the formation of the Lycurgan constitution is 
unknown and indeterminable although Plutarch gives the 
50 
number at 9,000 for the number of Spartiates. One of 
the earliest references to a number of helots is found in 
Herodotus who records that seven attended each Spartiate 
51 
soldier. ~j The number of helots appears to have been 
52 
enormous in relation to that of Spartiates. In numbers 
the perioeci were probably somewhere between helots and 
53 
Spartiates. The number of Spartan citizens at the time 
of Lycurgus is not known exactly which causes problems in 
21 
determing just when the Spartiates did begin to decline in 
numbers. If Plutarch is correct and there were 9,000 
Spartiates at the time of Lycurgus then the decline must 
have been in process or have started soon after, because 
54 
by 479 there were only some 5,000 Spartiates of actual 
55 
military age between twenty and fifty. The number of men 
of combat age in 418 was 2,500 with the total number of 
Spartiates being between 3,000 and 4,000, according to 
56 
Thucydides. Xenophon gives the total number of citizens 
57 
as being approximately 2,500 in 394. By the Battle of 
Leuctra in 371 there were only 1,050 Spartiates 700 of 
58 
whom were at the battle. By his own time Aristotle 
reports that there were less than 1,000 Spartan citizens. 
59 
These numbers present a significant decrease in the number 
of citizens from the time of Lycurgus to after 369. 
There are of course problems with the numbers and 
other figures available. In many cases where ancient 
sources have 11 Lacedaemonians 11 and a figure, the number can 
refer to only Spartiates or to a mixture of Spartiates and 
perioeci both. Often there is no way of differentiating 
between methods used, although Herodotus and Aristotle 
denoted Spartiates as separate from the perioeci and 
60 
helots. The numbers also give no indication of the 
number of Spartiate women, of men over the maximum army 
age, or of children. However the available figures 
indicate that the actual number of Spartan citizens was 
22 
decreasing and that very few people were being admitted to 
the citizen class from below. 
Scholars have suggested many reasons for the decline 
61 
of the Spartan citizen population. One suggestion for 
the decrease is connected to the massive earthquake that 
struck Sparta in 464. Diodorus records that 20,000 
62 
Lacedaimonians died. Again there was no indication as 
to whether Diodorus means only Spartiates or includes the 
perioeci in this figure of 20,000, but examination of 
other sources reveals that it is probably the number of 
citizens and .perioeci together and possibly an 
exaggeration of the true number. The figure of 20,000 
Lacedaimonians is extremely large, but even if it were 
accurate, some scholars argue that a population should 
63 
quickly recover deficits which natural events caused. 
Therefore, although the earthquake had an immediate effect 
on the citizen population, it was not a lasting influence. 
Another argument advanced for the decline in Spartan 
male citizens is the effect of war. War casualties might 
have had some bearing on the decline of Spartiates, but 
were not sufficient to have caused such a drastic decline, 
especially when it is noted how few Spartiates actually 
64 
were casualties of the many battles. 
Other causes for the decline in the numbers of 
Spartiates cannot be so easily dismissed as having 
actually very little effect on the total citizen 
23 
population. Other reasons include a growing unwillingness 
on the part of the Spartiates to produce children. This 
in turn can be blamed on the accumulation of wealth and 
65 
land in the hands of increasingly fewer people. Desire 
to amass as much accumulative wealth as possible caused 
Spartan commoners to have fewer children in order to limit 
division of the property. In Sparta sons and daughters 
66 
were both entitled to share in the inheritance. 
Therefore if there was a daughter but no son, instead of 
trying to produce more children in the hopes of having a 
son the father sought the richest man who could be found 
to marry the daughter and thereby increased the amount of 
67 
wealth into fewer hands. Such a deliberate restriction 
in the number of children on the part of Spartiates may 
have caused a decline in population. 
Another cause of the decrease in the numbers of 
Spartiates is also linked to the accumulation of wealth in 
the hands of fewer and fewer Spartiates. The process of 
collecting property left many previous landholders without 
kleros to provide their contributions to the public 
messes. ~fhen Spartiates had sold or otherwise lost land, 
and were consequently unable to pay mess bills, they then 
24 
lost the rights of citizenship and joined the ranks of the 
inferior class, the hypomeiones. After dividing the 
inheritance, sons of lower class Spartiates who had 
numerous children discovered that their share of the 
inheritance was often not enough to provide for their 
68 
contributions. They also became inferiors. The loss of 
the Messenian helots because of the refounding of Messenia 
in 370/369 deprived many Spartiates of estates and means 
of living. The loss of Messenia caused many commoners to 
69 
become inferiors as well. The ever increasing number of 
hypomeiones indicated that the wealth required for 
retainig citizenship was harder to maintain. As their 
number increased, it is certain that the population of the 
Spartiates was declining. 
Another possible cause of the decrease of citizens is 
the limited population base. Most recent scholars have 
70 
overlooked this possibility. The major requirement to 
be a Spartiate was to have a Spartiate mother and a 
Spartiate father. There were few other ways to become a 
citizen which thereby limited the number of Spartans who 
could intermarry and produce offspring. Without the 
influx of "new" blood the gene pool stagnated, births 
71 
decreased, and defects could possibly increase. Spartan 
72 
women tended to marry later in life than most Greeks. 
This limited the number of children women could bear and 
73 
further restricted the number of Spartans. 
25 
The last three arguments working together were most 
likely directly responsible for the decline of the 
Spartiates. Yet in the end the Spartiates themselves were 
the only ones to blame for their diminishing numbers. 
Directly responsible for the limitations on citizenship 
and on child production, the commoners could ·have changed 
the situation. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SPARTAN COMMONER'S LIFESTYLE 
After examing the various orders of Sparta's society, 
one must consider the commoner's way of life. The 
ancients credited the shadowy figure of Lycurgus with the 
1 
development of the system of Spartan education. 
Aristotle says that the educational system was based on 
fighting, because the Spartans were, for the most part, 
2 
warriors. As discussed in the previous chapter, the major 
reason for the militarization of the Spartan citizens was 
the need to keep the helot population under control. The 
Spartans devised an educational system that enhanced and 
promoted military training among the citizens, enabling 
them to cope with helot uprisings as well as fighting 
foreign enemies. Spartans only counted those trained for 
war among their noblity, not anyone connected with manual 
3 
labor. The system of education directed the Spartan 
commoner into a pattern that resulted in a military 
career. His education influenced the way in which the 
Spartiate reacted towards other commoners, other classes, 
his leaders, and foreigners. 
Participation in the formal educational and training 
system, the agoge, was required for the Spartan commoner, 
30 
31 
because in order to qualify for citizenship the state 
demanded that the Spartiate successfully complete the 
discipline. The commoner who refused to submit to the 
agoge was in disgrace before the rest; he became adokimos, 
4 
that is "of no repute." Those who refused to partake in 
the agoge or "\vho failed to complete it sucessfully most 
likely fell into the class of inferiors, the hypomeiones, 
because they could not be chosen as ephors nor as senators 
5 
of the Gerousia. The king's heir seems to have been 
exempt from participation in the agoge, but any other sons 
of the king, like Agesilaus II who was a younger son, had 
to undergo the discipline or else could not qualify for 
6 
full citizenship. 
From the moment of birth until the age of thirty, the 
state controlled male Spartan children's lives, at which 
time they were able to direct themselves a little more. 
Upon birth, Spartan officials examined commoner children, 
and if found to be sound in body children lived; however, 
any physically defective children officials left exposed 
7 
in the countryside to die. Male children spent the first 
six years of their lives with their mothers, but at the 
8 
age of seven were enrolled into the agoge. Thus at 
seven Spartiate boys began the trials and tribulations 
which developed them into a part of the Spartan military 
framework. 
Boys 1vere in the charge of adult Spartiates who the 
government authorized to punish any youth's misconduct as 
9 
severely as the adult found to be necessary. Boys who 
32 
excelled in the discipline system became captains of their 
companies and the rest had to obey them and submit to 
10 
their punishments. The disciplinary system grouped boys 
according to age. They did not wear shoes, were allowed 
only one garment to wear for a whole year, slept together 
11 
in groups in the public barracks. They seldom bathed or 
12 
used ointments. The Spartan state allotted Spartiate 
youths only a moderate amount of food each day, but 
allowed the boys to steal whatever food they could in 
13 
order to decrease their hunger. Xenophon reports that 
the state implemented the stealing of food in order to 
make boys more resourceful at obtaining supplies which in 
14 
the future increased their worth as fighting men. 
However, if caught in the act of stealing, the boy's 
15 
supervisor punished the offender. The system thus 
permitted the stealing of food but not gettingcaught doing 
so, the latter resulting in punishment and ridicule. 
Every Spartan citizen could demand of the boys any 
task considered necessary to develop the youths. Each 
Spartiate could punish the boys for any wrongdoings in 
order to instil in the youths more respectfulness toward 
16 
elders and leaders. All Spartan men watched over these 
17 
children as if each were his own son. The Spartiates 
employed the custom to make the boys obey their leaders 
and encouraged active participation of adults with youths. 
33 
The boys were not idle; they were given endless tasks 
18 
to keep them occupied. They had little formal education 
and learned to read and write only at the most elementary 
19 
level. They spent long hours at exercise and sport 
designed to develop and harden their bodies physically. 
All Spartiate training was intended to make the boys 
accept commands willingly, prevail against hardships, and 
to be militarily victorious. 
The disciplinary training of the Spartiates lasted 
beyond maturity until the age of sixty. The agoge allowed 
no citizen to live only as he pleased but required 
20 
citizens follow a set regimen and join in public service. 
The Spartan law forbade the citizens to participate in any 
money-making activities because "wealth brought no 
21 
honor" to the Spartiate. When not at war, dances, 
feasts and festivals, hunts, and exercise occupied the 
22 
commoner fulltime. The Spartans were not to be seen 
loitering in the market places, but instead, were to be 
seen at places of exercise and of discussion of important 
political matters which trained them to speak concisely 
23 
and improve their minds. Because Spartans were unable 
to participate in mercantile or artistic occupations, they 
devoted their lives to serving the state and becoming 
professional soldiers which was to guarantee the continued 
safety and existence of Sparta. 
Upon the completion of their thirtieth year Spartan 
commoners were no longer required to live in the barracks 
and were able to establish their own residences with wife 
and family. At this time they acquired full citizenship 
24 
and could take places at the assembly, the Ecclesia. 
Spartiates were then able to have some privacy in their 
own home but still had to participate in the disciplinary 
system and eat at the public messes. 
Spartan men from the age of seven to their sixieth 
year ate at public messes called syssitia,--sometimes 
referred to as phiditia. Xenophon records that Lycurgus 
established the common eating places because he believed 
that they would "reduce disregard of orders to a 
25 
minimum." The individual syssitia consisted of fifteen 
members. Each member of the group had to approve new 
candidates when vacancies occurred which was most likely 
to happen in those groups of military age. Only one 
negative vote was necessary to prevent addition of a 
26 
hopeful applicant. Participation in the syssitia 
promoted camaraderie which was of value in high pressure 
34 
situations such as war when mess mates were able to depend 
upon fellows. 
The food served in the messes for the adult 
Spartiates was neither excessive nor minimal. Each 
Spartiate provided his portion of the food from his 
kleros, that piece of land which the state gave to each 
male citizen. Lot sizes varied so that each was 
theoretically able to provide yearly seventy bushels of 
barley for Spartiates plus twelve for his wife along with 
27 
a "proportionate amount of wine and [olive] oil." From 
this the citizen was required to contribute to his mess 
each month "a bushel of barley-meal, eight gallons of 
wine, five pounds of cheese, and two and a half pounds of 
figs and a small sum of money for things like flesh and 
28 
fish." 
29 
extras. 
Hunting and the richer men provided the 
The Spartiate sent to his mess portions of 
30 
sacrifices and game acquired from hunting. The food 
found at the syssitia was not scanty, but eating at the 
public messes prevented the commoners from gorging 
themselves, which they might at home, and thus become 
unfit for military and public services to the state. A 
35 
commoner's continued failure to pay his mess bill resulted 
in his loss of Spartan citizenship and relegation to the 
. 31 
inferior order of hypomeiones. 
Plutarch wrote that the custom of eating in the 
syssitia was rigidly observed. Even the kings had to eat 
32 
in the common mess. The only occasion upon which a 
person was allowed to dine at home was when he was late 
33 
due to performing a sacrifice or because of hunting. 
The syssitia provided the Spartan state with another 
method to control the activities of all its citizens, and 
even its kings. 
Spartan women exercised their bodies so that they 
would have healthy babies. Exercise also reduced the 
amount of suffering which occurred in the birthing 
34 
process. Motherhood was a woman's most important role 
in the Spartan state. Women and girls participated in 
such sports as wrestling, running, and the throwing of 
35 
36 
javelin and discus. Through physical activity the women 
intended to make sure that their children had the standard 
of fitness the Spartan state demanded. 
The state gave incentives to Spartan men to marry and 
produce children. Men without children deprived 
themselves of much of the honor that went with having 
children. In the assembly childless men had no rights to 
good seating and younger men could refuse to give them 
their seats because the elder had no offspring. Fines 
were even imposed on those men.who did not marry and beget 
36 
children. To benefit those men who had three sons or 
more, the state exempted such fathers from night 
37 
watches. The family was subservient to the state, 
because the Spartan's duty was first to the state with the 
family far behind in second place. The family enabled the 
commoner to "fulfill his responsibilities towards the 
38 
state," which was the production of children, especially 
males, who would enhance the military capabilities of the 
state. 
Marriage was the course to fulfilling the requirement 
of begetting children. The Spartan groom "stole" his wife 
from her parents' home and dressed her in the guise of a 
male, with her hair cut short to cheat evil spirits which 
39 
might otherwise do their marriage harm. Spartan 
marriages were at a later age, for the most part, than 
40 
those among the other ancient Greeks. If a man married 
before his thirtieth year, he was unable to live with his 
wife because the agoge training required him to reside 
37 
with his fellow males in the barracks. He was able to see 
his wife only occasionally after sneaking out of the 
barracks at night. Xenophon reports that Lycurgus had put 
restrictions on intercourse, because infrequent meetings 
of the husband and wife would result in their being more 
eager and would surely result in the reproduction of 
41 
better and healthier children. After his thirtieth year 
the husband resided with his wife and family of girls and 
those boys under seven. 
There were bm other methods of acquiring children 
which did not directly involve marriage. Xenophon speaks 
of a tradition where an elderly man with a young wife and 
n0 children had to bring into a family a young man whose 
qualities the older man admired. This young man then 
begat the children of the wife. The resulting children 
42 
were considered to be the older man's not the younger's. 
The other way of producing children Plutarch describes. In 
this way a man, without children and perhaps not himself 
married, could have children by another man's wife. If 
the man admired the children of a certain Spartan woman, 
he could-approach the woman's husband. Then with the 
husband's approval, the man without children could then 
43 
mate with the woman to prqduce a child. This enabled 
the childless man to achieve the state's requirement of 
children. With the practice of these two methods and 
marriage the Spartan commoner fulfilled his obligation to 
the state to reproduce. 
38 
Another aspect of Spartan life was the prohibition of 
the possession of large amounts of silver and gold. Iron 
money was the trading medium of the Spartans. Tradition 
44 
gave the formulation of these regulations to Lycurgus; 
however, this was most unlikely because coins did not 
exist in great quantities until the fifth century and 
45 
Sparta herself did not mint coins until after this date. 
The rejection of gold and silver must have been added 
later to the constitution in the hopes of preventing an 
economic division among the homoioi. As seen in the last 
chapter, the state was unable to prevent the acquisition 
of wealth and land into the possession of a few commoners. 
Foreign coins were in circulation in Sparta as early as 
46 
the time of the Persian Wars. The Spartan government 
most likely paid their mercenaries (who increased in 
number after the Peloponnesian Wars) in gold or silver 
coin because the iron coins were too bulky. In addition 
the Spartans did not reward the mercenary fighters with 
citizenship or Spartan land so a coinage system was 
necessary. Xenophon recorded that the state fined those 
47 
citizens who had gold or silver in their homes. The 
39 
state feared gold and silver as corruptive elements but in 
the end was unable to prevent their prevalence. 
The Spartan state and its constitution intended 
everything in the commoner's way of life to increase the 
practices of obedience and conformity among the 
Spartiates. The individual was to be subservient to the 
state. He was to concentrate on those aspects of life 
which promoted the state such as being a professional 
soldier and producing strong healthy children to continue 
the tradition. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SPARTIATE ROLES IN THE SPARTAN STATE 
The Spartan commoners were eligible for all 
governmental offices in Sparta with the exception of the 
hereditary kingships. In order to qualify for a state 
position, Spartiates had to have completed the training of 
the agoge, the disciplinary system. In addition, 
commoners had to be in good standing with regards to the 
1 
syssitia or mess bills. The prominent government roles 
available to to Spartiates were three in number: the 
Ecclesia or general assembly, the ephorate or chief 
magistrates, and the gerousia or senate. In addition to 
these three offices there were several less important 
state and military posts which commoners could possess. 
In any of these offices Spartiates could advance both 
politically within the state and popularly among the 
Spartan people. 
Ancient sources again credit the Lycurgan 
constitution, the Rhetra, with the establishment of many 
2 
of the government seats. The Rhetra is said to have 
established within the Spartan government all aspects 
necessary for proper rule of the state. The dual 
kingships represented the monarchical type of government; 
43 
the gerousia, the oligarichical and the assembly the 
3 
democratic. The ephorate was seen as either democratic 
or tyrannical; democratic because any commoner could hold 
44 
the office, tyrannical because of the amount of power that 
4 
the ephors had. By having all of these governing 
elements in one state Lycurgus hoped to avoid the problems 
which one type of government alone would create. 
The Ecclesia was the democratic section of the 
Spartan government because all adult male Spartiates who 
5 
qualified and were over the age of thirty attended the 
meetings of the general assembly. In the early days of 
the assembly the kings presided over the meetings of the 
Ecclesia, but the ephors gradually assumed the role of 
6 
leading the meetings. The meeting place of the Ecclesia 
was outside of the city of Sparta, somewhere between the 
two tributaries of the Eurotas River, Babyca and Cnacion. 
The meeting place was not inside of a building but rather 
7 
in the open. Possible reasons for meeting outside of the 
city resulted from the need for space for the assembly 
(Sparta was small and did not possess a building large 
enough to hold thee the entire assembly) and the need of 
the assembly to concentrate on the matters put before it 
away from the distractions of the polis. Ancient sources 
are vague as to exactly where the assembly's meeting place 
was located. Space was a primary issue because the total 
number of Spartiates making up the Ecclesia was near 
8 
5,000 at the height of the Spartiate population. As the 
45 
members of Spartiates dwindled so, too, did the number of 
members of the Ecclesia. The decreasing numbers seems to 
have made the assembly less democratic and more 
aristocratic in nature. 
Scholars have long debated the actual role of the 
common assembly in the decision making process. Many 
scholars both modern and ancient argue that the Rhetra 
permitted the Ecclesia the right to vote only for or 
against measures put before it by the kings, gerousia, and 
9 
ephors. Other historians contend that the assembly did 
10 
have the right of debating the issues. The major 
problem in providing the solution here lies in the limited 
and scanty information available in the ancient sources 
and in the surviving fragment of the Rhetra contained in 
11 
Plutarch's Lycurgus. The Lycurgus is a source whose 
major disadvantage in reliability results from the 
lateness of its actual writing. Plutarch states that 
Lycurgus prohibited the actual written record of the 
Rhetras, a fact which provides the explanation of why the 
document is not found in very many extant forms, complete 
12 
or fragmentary. The Rhetra, as Plutarch quotes it, 
reads: 
Having established a cult of Syllianian Zeus and 
Athena, having done the 'tribing and obing', and 
having established a Gerousia of thirty members 
including the kings, season in season out they 
are to hold Apellai between Babyka and Knadion; 
the Gerousia is both to introduce proposals and 
to stand aloof; the damos rsic) is to have power 
to.'give a decisive verdict'.13 
46 
The Rhetra itself is not clear whether the Ecclesia could 
debate the issues, but the addition of a rider, or 
amendment to the Rhetra indicates that Ecclesia did debate 
the proposals put before it. The Rider reads "if the 
damos [sic] speaks crookedly, the Gerousia and the kings 
14 
are to be removers." 
The Kings Polydorus and Theopompus, Plutarch 
indicates, inserted the Rider because members of the 
assembly had overstepped their political limits concerning 
the making of laws for the Spartan state and these two 
15 
kings wanted to prevent the corruptions. Plutarch 
believes that the Ecclesia could only accept or reject 
motions which the kings and gerousia put to the assembly. 
He does not say how the assembly members were able to 
corrupt their authority the occurance of which resulted in 
16 
the addition of the Rider to the Rhetra. 
Aristotle considers the assembly to be of no great 
17 
importance in Sparta; it merely afirmed or denied 
according to what the gerousia and ephorate had already 
18 
decided. Such an image of the assembly reduced its 
importance to a mere trivality, "a more or less empty 
19 
form". The Spartan Ecclesia appears to have been an 
organ of the state's government which heard the proposals 
20 
advanced by the g§rousia, kings, or ephors and then 
voted, without discussion on its part, for or against the 
issues after the Rider •vas attached to the Rhetra. Before 
the addition of the Rider it was likely that the assembly 
47 
did debate measures, but made some decisions which did not 
please those who put the issues before the assembly. 
These inappropriate decisions resulted in the abolition of 
the Ecclesia's right to discuss matters through the 
establishment of the amendment to the constitution. After 
the introduction of the Rider, commoners "in all 
probability lost also the right of raising opposition in 
the Apella [the Ecclesia] to proposals introduced by the 
21 
gerontes". Thus the addition to the Spartan 
constitution greatly restricted the activities of the 
Ecclesia in making decisions. 
In addition to voting on issues the assembly did have 
several other duties. The Ecclesia voted in general on 
all aspects of foreign policy and specifically on the 
questions of peace and war, on campaigns, and on treaties. 
The assembly was responsible for appointing Spartan 
generals and admirals for those campaigns that the kings 
did not lead themselves. The members of the assembly 
elected the gerontes and ephors and appointed other 
officials. If any dispute over succession to the crown 
arose, the Ecclesia decided in the matter. The Spartan 
Ecclesia emancipated helots, rescinded citizenships, and 
22 
voted on proposed laws. There is no evidence that the 
assembly conducted any sort of trials; this procedure was 
23 
limited to the ephorate and gerousia. 
Another problem regarding the Spartan general 
assembly arises over the exact meeting times of the 
assembly. Here the problem is the phrase "~;>,.(S iff ~,,J..fS 
~?7':Ue(4' E ~ v " found in the Rhetra. This phrase indicat~s 
when the assembly 1vas to meet and the phrase can be 
interpreted in many ways. Possible translations include 
"to assemble in the Ecclesia," "month after month," 
"season after season," or "year after year". Michell 
48 
accepts "season after season" to be the interpretation and 
meaning meetings being held each month, possibly at the 
24 
full moon. Oliva, Gilbert, and Fine believe that the 
awkward passage means for the assembly to meet in regular 
25 
Monthly meetings. However, Chrimes takes "season after 
season" to mean that there was just one meeting each 
season of winter, spring, and summer or perhaps only in 
winter and summer. To account Thucydides' saying that the 
assembly meetings were at the full moon, Chrimes 
interprets Thucydides as meaning at the full moon in the 
26 
one month of the season not at each full moon. Wade-
Gery accepts the translation of "year after year". His 
acceptance of this phrase is based on the other term used 
to refer to the Spartan Ecclesia, the Apella, which would 
seem to be derived from a meeting in the month Apellaios 
27 
at the beginning of the year. The term "Apella" could 
also be accepted because of Plutarch's use of "~7fe~~~4c.c. v" 
in Lycurgus. Other authorities such as Hooker and 
28 
Forrest refer to the infrequent assembly meetings. The 
acceptance of one system over the others seems totally 
49 
arbitary and when considered with the right of the ephors 
to call up the assembly whenever they required it, almost 
any of the various arguments seems feasible. It would be 
necessary for the assembly to meet at least once a year to 
elect the ephors and any other annual officials. However, 
one meeting a year would not enable the Ecclesia to 
examine all foreign policy matters and for that reason 
alone the assembly must have met more than once a year. 
Monthly meetings appear to be more appropriate because of 
the decisions which needed to be made concerning war, 
peace, and other foreign policies which especially in time 
of war could not be delayed for any long length of time 
without decisions. 
The ephorate can also be referred to as a democratic 
element in the Spartan government because any Spartan 
29 
commoner was eligible for the office. The ephorate 
consisted of five ephors elected annually by popular 
30 
vote. The office was a one term only position which 
31 
began in the autumn. The ephors were accountable for 
32 
their actions on leaving office. One ephor was chosen 
as the chief or eponymous ephor and gave his name to the 
year. The eponymous ephor was able to use considerable 
33 
influence. The ephors decided all their 'questions by a 
34 
vote of the majority of their number. Since popular 
vote secured their election, the ephors were in theory 
35 
answerable to the will of the Spartan citizens. The 
ephors were responsible for the daily government of the 
36 
Spartan state. Their offices were located in the 
37 
Spartan market place. 
Herodotus credits the foundation of the ephorate to 
38 
Lycurgus. Aristotle and other ancient sources consider 
King Theopompus, who was king during the First Messenian 
War, the creator of the ephorate about one hundred years 
39 
50 
after Lycurgus• reforms. The exact duties of the office 
in the beginning are unclear but it is fairly certain that 
its powers were not as extensive as in the fourth and 
fifth centuries. The fact that the ephors are not 
mentioned in the Rhetra has given rise much debate on the 
part of scholars as to whether they actually existed at 
the time of the consistution•s founding. Some scholars 
40 
argue that the ephorate did not exist until later, while 
others say that the position of the ephors was rather weak 
41 
at the time. It is most probable that the first ephors 
were mainly advisors to the kings when the office was 
first begun. The kings appointed the ephors to govern the 
state -vvhile the kings 1vere absent from Sparta for long 
42 
periods of time during the Messenian Wars. The ephors 
were not able to exercise any considerable influence on 
Spartan policies while the kings nominated the ephors. 
The ability to influence Spartan governmental procedures 
occurred as time passed. Later ephors like Asteropos and 
Chilon increased the power of the ephorate. Asteropos 
caused the ephorate to become a popularly elected office 
43 
rather than one which the kings appointed. Chilon made 
51 
his office as important as the kings' authority in guiding 
44 
the Spartan state. The ephors slowly gained more power 
and influence, to the detriment of the kingship, until the 
ephors were too powerful according to Aristotle, who 
45 
equates the ephorate to a tyranny. From the end of the 
seventh century the ephorate became a more important 
46 
element of the Spartan government until somewhere 
between 500 and 467 when the ephorate acquired its supreme 
47 
power in the state. 
The duties of the ephorate acquired were many and 
most of their duties were extremely important for the 
continuation of the Spartan government. The Ecclesia 
declared war, but the ephors were the ones who set the age 
limits for the troops who would serve in the war and they 
48 
issued the order to form the army. At first the kings 
went into battle together but after conflicts between the 
kings during Cleomones I's reign, the kings were sent to 
separate battle areas. When on campaign two ephors 
accompanied the kings. The ephors were not there to 
interfere in the king's decisions but were there only to 
view the proceedings unless the king asked for the ephor's 
49 
help or advice. The kings-were the military 
50 
commanders. Aristotle says that the ephors divided the 
kings and then accompanied the kings on their campaigns, 
because the ephors 11 thought that the safety of the state 
51 
depended on division between the kings••. The ephorate 
gave the generals their order in times of war and would 
52 
recall any general who failed in battle because of his own 
52 
neglect. The ephorate was responsible for the major 
procedures in warfare and were able to dispatch envoys in 
the name of the Spartan state. They received the foreign 
envoys and decided what foreign policy matters or treaties 
53 
would be sent to the Ecclesia. The assembly had the 
final vote in the matters of foreign policy, but the 
ephorate had the monopoly on foreign affairs. 
Those officials which the kings did not appoint or 
54 
the Ecclesia did not elect, the ephors appointed. The 
ephorate could discipline and even fine all other 
magistrates of the Spartan state. The ephors could remove 
officials from their offices and even imprison or press 
55 
capital charges against officials. At the end of their 
terms of office, lesser Spartan officials had to issue an 
56 
account of their activities to the ephorate. The ephors 
then judged the activities of the Spartan administrators. 
If any wrongdoings on the part of an official were found 
57 
the ephors could fine the person. 
The ephors fined and punished any Spartiate for any 
58 
illegal act. They annually declared a war on the helots 
59 
with the crypteia. Without a prior trial to determine 
60 
guilt, the ephorate was able to execute any helot. The 
ephorate expelled any foreigner whose presence they did 
61 
53 
not want. Ephors could summon before them the king who 
could refuse the summons twice but upon the third occasion 
had to appear before the council of the ephors. The 
ephors could fine and even arrest a king. Upon the 
entrance of the kings to the various meeting places, the 
62 
ephors alone remained seated. The ephorate had a wide 
spread disciplinary authority. 
The ephors called the meetings of the Ecclesia and 
presided over all meetings of the general assembly which 
they could summon at occasions other than the regularly 
established meeting times. The ephors also presided over 
63 
the meetings of the gerousia. Along with the gerousia 
the ephorate formed a court for all criminal cases except 
for those criminal matters which the gerousia judged 
64 
alone. The jurisdiction in all lawsuits of upmost 
65 
importance rested with the ephorate. They heard the 
66 
majority of the civil cases. Aristotle reports that the 
ephors judged the cases involving homicide and breach of 
67 
contract. The responsibility for enforcing and 
implementing the sentences issued in court cases belonged 
to the ephors. 
The ephors held a wide variety of miscellaneous 
duties. They had general supervision over the education 
68 
of the Spartan youth. The ephors supervised both the 
perioeci and the helots. They received war booty, managed 
taxation, regulated the calendar, and offered some of the 
69 
minor public sacrifices. Every month the ephors 
54 
exchanged an oath with the kings in which the kings agreed 
to govern according to the Spartan laws and the ephors 
70 
would preserve the royal authority. There were few 
areas in which the ephors did not exercise some sort of 
authority. 
Aristotle reports that because the ephors were chosen 
from the whole Spartiate population many poorer men became 
ephors and once in office were susceptible to the taking 
71 
of bribes. The ephors, like many other government 
officials, had to account for their actions, but there is 
no indication in the ancient texts of major reprisals 
72 
being directed against an ex-ephor. The possibility of 
bribery among the ephors does appear possible given the 
later property acquiring habits of the Spartiates, but 
there is little information to substantiate such an event. 
The third major government body in which the Spartan 
commoners participated was the gerousia, or the senate. 
73 
This body met in its own offices in the market place. 
There were twenty-eight commoners in the senate along with 
the two kings. Each member held his position for life and 
for this reason was not responsible for his actions to any 
other public official. The qualifications needed to 
become a geronte were to be sixty or more years of age and 
to be elected successfully through the popular vote of the 
Spartan people in the assembly. The election process was 
74 
accomplished in the following manner. The commoners up 
for election to the gerousia went before the Ecclesia one 
by one in no certain order. The assembly then applauded 
for each candidate. The judges of the applause were in a 
55 
separate area where they could hear the amount of approval 
but yet could not see the person receiving the vote. The 
judges then indicated which candidate had received the 
most approval from the assembly. The ones who received 
the greatest amount of applause became members of the 
gerousia to fill the empty seats, while the rejects went 
home to try again the next time a vacancy ocurred in the 
75 
senate. The election to the gerousia was a highly 
honorable position considered to be a reward for virtue 
and excellence in the Spartan system. Some scholars 
indicate that membership in the gerousia was limited to 
76 
certain groups of aristocratic families. Because it was 
a much desired office and popularly elected, the 
possibility existed that only those with wealth (which was 
supposedly illegal in Sparta) or prestige had a chance at 
election to the gerousia. There is no information in the 
ancient sources which records the qualifications 
77 
reguarding property or birth. Aristotle implies that 
election to the gerousia was limited to the nobles, the 
78 
aristocracy, alone, but he might mean that instead of 
wealthy persons those men best qualified through past 
79 
achievements were to rule through the senate. 
The Rhetra indicates that the constitution provides 
80 
for the establishment of the gerousia, but it is likely 
that even before the Rhetra the kings had some sort of 
81 
council of elders to advise and help them. The Rhetra 
defines the number of gerontes and along with the Rider 
places the control of Sparta into the hands of the 
82 
gerousia. In reality, however, the gerousia did not 
have the supreme authority because the ephorate had 
56 
acquired many powerful duties, particularly by the rule of 
Cleomenes I in the late fifth century. 
The major functions of the gerousia were twofold: as 
a court and as a decider of the issues to go before the 
assembly. The gerousia judged all Spartan criminal cases 
83 
involving murder and treason. The gerontes along with 
the ephors judged cases strictly involving activities of 
the kings. The sentences which the senate imposed could 
be monetary fines, loss of civil rights, banishment from 
Sparta, or even death. The ephors then carried out the 
84 
decisions. The other function of the gerousia was the 
process of deciding just what items involving Spartan 
government or foreign policy would be put to the Ecclesia 
85 
for its vote. The senate introduced the matters brought 
before the assembly and could veto any decisions of the 
86 
Ecclesia which the gerousia considered ill-judged. 
Xenophon reasons that the election process through 
which the older Spartan men went to gain admittance to the 
57 
gerousia would prevent the neglect of high principles and 
87 
values among the Spartiates even in old age. In this 
way the agoge continued to influence the older men just as 
it did the boys and younger Spartan commoners. The 
gerousia was thus the rule of the best and wisest of 
Spartan men who, though over sixty, were still a 
functioning part of Sparta's society and government. 
The office of king was the one position to which 
commoners of Sparta could not aspire. The kingships w·ere 
hereditary in the Agiad and Eurypontid families. The role 
of the kings in Sparta became greatly reduced with the 
establishment of both the ephorate and the gerousia. The 
judicial functions of the kings were very limited and 
existed only in the form of the king's participation in 
the gerousia. Matters of religion were the king's 
responsibilities and the kings performed the majority of 
88 
the sacrifices. The king, when capable, led the troops 
into battle and was the leader in all matters relating to 
89 
vvar. As the ephorate and gerousia acquired more of the 
originally royla prerogatives, the kings became more and 
more figureheads of the Spartan state. Such was the the 
case by the fifth century. However, Aristotle sees the 
establishment of the ephorate and the gerousia as 
guaranteeing the continued existence of the system of 
kingship that was gradually replaced in most other Greek 
90 
city-states. 
Other positions of authority which gave Spartan 
commoners a position from which to influence activities 
were in government and military institutions. Three of 
the more important positions were proxenia, harmost, and 
navarch (also found as nauarch). The proxenia was an 
appointed civil official who was to look after the 
merchants of other cities, a type of public relations job 
which was a common hospitality to foreigners practiced in 
91 
ancient Greece. Harmosts were governors whom the 
Spartan state sent out to administer the many islands and 
city-states in Greece during the Spartan supremacy after 
the Peloponnesian War and the defeat of Athens until the 
92 
Thebans defeated the Spartans at Leuctra. The conduct 
and attitude of the harmost aroused hatred against Sparta 
in these governed cities. Many harmosts acted as petty 
58 
tyrants or actively sought to benefit themselves and their 
93 
friends. The navarch or admiral was a military 
appointment for one year and could not be held twice by 
the same person. Since the king could not control 
activities on both land and sea at the same time during a 
94 
war, the office of navarch was established. The navarch 
had control of the Spartan fleet and had almost the same 
amount of power as the king when it came to decisions 
95 
affecting the navy. 
The types of offices the Spartan commoners held and 
the duties of these offices permitted the commoners to 
have a large share of the government of Sparta. 
59 
Opportunity existed in which commoners could become more 
influential than even the kings. This condition lead to 
conflicts betvveen individual commoners and the kings or 
the ephorate and the kings. Some of the conflicts will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
SOME SPARTAN COMMONERS 
In respect to the population of the Spartiates the 
actual number of commoners named in the ancient sources is 
relatively few. For the most part those commoners known 
to modern scholars were mainly various heroes who 
exemplified the Spartan image of what a man should be. An 
examination of the recorded deeds of these men reveals 
some of the levels to which Spartan commoners could rise 
in importance to their state. The political offices of 
the commoners who are mentioned in the ancient sources 
were governmental, such as ephors, like Chilon, or in the 
military, like Brasidas and Lysander. 
The first commoners mentioned in the ancient works 
are the ephors Asteropos and Chilon. Chilon was ephor 
around the middle of the sixth century, while Asteropos 
1 
was sometime before him. These two men increased the 
power and influence of the office of ephor. Asteropos 
took the control of the ephorate away from. the kings who 
had decided who would be ephors before that time. After 
2 
Asteropos and Chilon the assembly chose the ephors. 
Through the change in election procedure, men with great 
public images or military repute more than likely secured 
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the election to the posts in the ephorate. The ephors not 
only became subject to greater influence from the public 
but were able to bring their ideas and desires before the 
masses and influence and guide the policies of Sparta. 
Chilon helped to increase the authority of the ephors so 
that the ephors were equal to, and in some ways superior 
to, the kings since the ephors could call the kings before 
3 
them to account for their activities. Chilon's influence 
on Sparta was so well known to the ancient Greeks that 
writers, such as Diodorus, referred to him as one of the 
4 
"Seven Wise Men". 
One Spartiate who had all the powers of kings without 
ever actually having the title was Pausanias, regent for 
Pleistarchos. Because the Agiad king was a minor, 
Pausanias commanded the Spartan army during many of its 
encounters with the Persians during the wars with Persia. 
One battle at which Pausanias led and the Spartan forces 
5 
won victory was that of Plataea. In 478, the regent 
commanded the Spartan fleet and captured Cyrus and 
6 
Byzantium. While in Byzantium Pausanias acquired habits 
which the Spartan constitution prohibited. He adopted 
many of the Median and Persian manners of clothing and 
dining. The regent became arrogant and made it difficult 
7 
for anyone to meet with him. In short, he became greedy 
for wealth and power. In 470 the ephors, aware of the 
rumors in circulation about Pauanias' actions, recalled 
Pausanias to Sparta to stand trial. 
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Diodorus states that Pausanias secretly made a friend 
of the Persian king Xerxes and the satraph Artabazus who 
supplied Pausanias with large amounts of money with which 
8 
to corrupt the Spartans. Indications existed that 
9 
Pausanias also attempted to incite the helots to revolt. 
The ephors tried Pausanias and found him guilty of 
treason. The regent fled to a temple where the ephors had 
him blockaded in and starved. Just before his death, the 
ephors took Pausanias out of his sanctuary so that he 
10 
could not die on consecrated land. Pausanias 
represented the limits to which a commoner could reach in 
the Spartan govermental structure. However, the ephors 
did not treat him any differently than they did a king who 
strayed from the ways of the Spartan constitution. 
Brasidas was the Spartan commoner who first received 
great attention in the Peloponnesian War for his valor and 
accomplishments. Plutarch says that war increased 
Brasidas• importance and gave him the opportunity for 
11 
great achievements. In 431, he kept the Peloponnesian 
city-state of Methone from becoming prey to the Athenian 
12 
fleet. For this action Brasidas became the first 
13 
soldier of the war to be praised by the Spartans. 
Because of his military achievements, Brasidas acquired a 
powerful political position. Brasidas was also ephor in 
429 which speaks of his political position in Sparta. 
Thucydides records that the Spartan refusal to send 
Brasidas reinforcements in 423 was, in part, a result of 
14 
jealousy among other leading men of Sparta. 
Forrest describes Brasidas as an able diplomat, a 
15 
good general, and an honest man. "He was lucky; brave, 
with a brilliant tactical and strategic eye and the 
68 
boldness to act on what he saw; over confident in hopes of 
welcome in Thrace but quick to adapt himself to what he 
16 
found." Brasidas was not a peaceful man and was hostile 
to the idea of a peace being arranged between Athens and 
17 18 
Sparta. He died fighting at Amphipolis in 421. 
Brasidas through his governmental position was able to 
influence Sparta•s attitude towards war with Athens. 
Toward the end of the Peloponnesian War another 
commoner, Lysander, appeared on the political scene in 
Sparta. Lysander became an important military figure and 
19 
was chosen navarch for the year 408/407. Plutarch 
reports that Lysander•s father was a Heracleidae but not 
of the royal family and that Lysander grew up in 
20 
poverty. Lysander was so successful as navarch that 
when his year ended and Callicratidas replaced him, many 
of the Spartan allies requested Lysander•s return as 
commander of the fleet of the Spartans and the 
21 
Peloponnesian allies. Callicratidas died in the summer 
22 
of 406 at a sea battle, but the assembly would not break 
the tradition of allowing a person to hold the office of 
navarch more than once. The Spartans appointed Aracus as 
commander and made Lysander vice-admiral. However, the 
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real command of the ships would belong to Lysander; Aracus 
23 
was only a token navarch. This policy continued to be 
followed, but Lysander, although without the title, acted 
as the commander of the Spartan fleet. 
Lysander•s influence in Sparta was great enough to 
enable him to place his candidate Agesilaus upon the 
24 
Spartan throne when King Agis died in 399. Agesilaus 
was King Agis• brother, but Agis had a son Leotychidas who 
was next in line as king. Unfortunately for Leotychidas, 
his patrimony was questionable because Agis had remarked 
upon Leotychidas• birth that the child was not his. 
Lysander and Agesilaus brought this issue of Leotychidas• 
parentage before the assembly who heard both sides of the 
matter and then agreed in favor of Agesialus• becoming the 
25 
next king. Lysander•s influence with the Spartans and 
their allies caused a rift to develop between him and the 
26 
new king Agesilaus II. Lysander had probably hoped to 
influence Agesilaus in all his activities since Lysander 
had been principally responsible for Agesilaus• kingship. 
Instead, Agesilaus began to do the opposite of what 
Lysander advised. After a time Lysander realized what was 
occurring and found out that Agesilaus was not going to 
allow another to control his movements. 
27 
Lysander was a friend of the Persian prince Cyrus. 
Lysander was very influential in persuading the Spartan 
Assembly to agree to Sparta•s helping Cyrus in his attempt 
to overthrow his brother and become king of Persia in his 
28 
place. Sparta's aid to Cyrus resulted in trouble for 
the city-state when Cyrus revolt failed. 
Lysander had great influence with the Lacedaemonian 
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allies in that he was responsible for the establishment of 
29 
decarchies in many of the Greek city-states. The 
decarchies were composed of groups of ten men generally 
favorable to Lysander's politics. The decarchies were 
oligarchs who helped to oust the democratic elements in 
the various city-states to insure that polis' loyalty to 
Sparta rather than to Athens. Lysander also appointed 
many of his friends as harmosts or governors of different 
30 
city-states. Lysander in this way conferred many great 
favors on his friends and built a loyal following to 
himself. Because of his control of these men, Plutarch 
says that Lysander became arrogant and over confident in 
31 
himself. Lysander's decarchies and harmost friends were 
often unpopular and caused many of Sparta's allies to 
become unhappy with Sparta, a fact which in turn helped 
lead to the Corinthian War and the loss of Sparta's 
32 
hegemony in Greece. 
Plutarch remarks that Lysander had obtained all of 
his offices with the consent and approval of his fellow 
33 
Spartiates. Plutarch regards Lysander as the founder of 
his own political and military greatness, but not a man 
34 
who acquired any authority contrary to the Spartan laws. 
Lysander was at that time the "first of her [sparta's] 
35 
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first men and best of her best". Lysander did not abuse 
his authority and power but remained a steady and virtuous 
36 
man. Although Lysander did not acquire possession of 
great wealth for himself he, nevertheless, sent back to 
37 
Sparta large amounts of gold and other rich spoils. 
Many opposed these luxury items and saw them as being 
38 
injurious to the Spartan state. Lysander's opponents 
saw in the commoner's ownership of gold and silver, the 
method by which the majority of Spartiates had already 
fallen (or could fall) below the standards of Lysander 
because, as his enemies saw the matter, Lysander was 
teaching Sparta "to want what he himself had learned not 
39 
to want". Plutarch points out that Lysander was totally 
uncorrupted by material items because he died as poor as 
40 
he had been born. 
Lysander did not work just to benefit the Spartan 
state, he was also ambitious. After his death the 
Spartans discovered that Lysander had formulated a plot to 
overthrow the traditional Spartan system of rule by the 
two kings. Lysander wanted instead to make the office 
elective where the assembly chose the king from among all 
of the Spartiates. The lucky person would be chosen not 
because of birth but because of his ability to govern and 
41 
guide the state wisely. Lysander hoped that after the 
establishment of the new system of governing that he 
himself would be the first elected to the Spartan 
42 
72 
kingship. He made his attempt at revolution not through 
open warfare, but rather, by persuasion'and by trying to 
receive religious backing through one of the oracles at 
43 
Delphi, Dodona, or Ammon. Lysander was unable to get 
official religious sanctions for his movement. He died in 
395 near Haliartos without having progressed far in his 
44 
effort to become king. Lysander•s attempt to create a 
new system for appointing the king undoubtedly came from 
his desire to secure a position in which he could have a 
permanent and continuing influence upon Spartan policy. 
Lysander could not hold any other Spartan office for a 
long continuous period during which he could direct the 
state•s activities. The position of longest tenure open 
to a commoner, that of geronte, was not available to 
Lysander because of his youth. 
Lysander•s influence in Sparta lasted from the later 
part of the Peloponnesian War through much of the Spartan 
supremacy in Greece and ended with his death in the early 
part of the Corinthian War. Lysander was given much of 
45 
the credit for the defeat of the Athenians. Because of 
his military activities he was popular with the Spartan 
people and through this popularity was able to direct the 
people in directions he favored. 
The next Spartan commoner to influence the state•s 
policies was Antalcidas. Through Antalcidas• negotiations 
with the Persian king, the Lacedaemonians agreed to the 
73 
King's Peace which ended the Corinthian conflict. 
Antalcidas was navarch for the year 388 and ephor for that 
of 370. The Spartan state first authorized Antalcidas to 
negotiate with the Persians in 392. His attempts to 
secure peace failed at first because neither the Persian 
king Artaxerxes nor his allies were willing to agree to a 
peace settlement which could have primarily benefited 
46 
Sparta. The peace that Antalcidas finally made with 
Persia in 388 was more of a temporary settlement than a 
46 
total solution to the problems of the Greek city-states. 
Plutarch reports that so long as Sparta was supreme 
in Greece the Persian king Artaxerxes treated Antalcidas 
as guest and friend~ but after Sparta's loss at Leuctra 
48 
the king ignored and slighted Antalcidas. Antalcidas• 
achievements as a navarch and negotiator faded into 
history when he once again became a private citizen of 
Sparta. In Sparta, the citizens rejected and neglected 
Antalcidas who in response to this cavalier treatment 
49 
starved himself to death after he had served as ephor. 
These few men previously discussed are not the only 
Spartan commoners to be mentioned in the ancient sources. 
Their lives do, however, indicate how influential certain 
Spartan commoners could become in Spartan politics and 
government. The careers of these men also show the paths 
that the commoners had to take in order to achieve their 
goals and become prominent in Sparta. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN SPARTAN KINGS AND COMMONERS 
Because of the highly important state government 
positions which Spartan commoners held, conflicts between 
the kings and the commoners of Sparta were a fairly normal 
occurrence. Most common conflicts were between the ephors 
and kings with ambition, power, or stubbornness. Other 
problems arose between individual commoners who were 
influential and their kings, such as the troubled 
relationship between Lysander and Agesilaus. An 
examination of some of the individual kings and their 
problems follows as well as a general discussion of the 
specific conflicts. 
One of the first Spartan kings recorded as having 
major conflicts with the ephors was the great king 
Cleomenes I. Some scholars see Cleomenes as one of the 
greatest, both militarily and politically, of the Spartan 
1 
kings. However, Cleomenes was implicated in conjunction 
2 
with the helot revolt in 490. At that time Cleomenes was 
in exile in Arcadia for having bribed the Delphic 
priestess to declare his fellow king Demaratus 
illegitimate. While in exile Cleomenes had been engaged 
in creating trouble for the Spartan government. Wallace 
77 
says that Cleomenes probably provoked or assisted in the 
3 
helot rebellion. 
The ephors had earlier in his reign put Cleomenes on 
trial for having failed to capture Argos, one of Sparta's 
4 
most bitter enemies. Cleomenes was able on that 
occassion to convince the ephors that he was innocent of 
5 
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the charges leveled against him, but this did not prevent 
his being brought before the ephors a second time. 
Wallace and other historians believe that the ephors, 
as a result of the king's activities, brought Cleomenes 
6 
back to Sparta and did away with him. Herodotus relates 
that Cleomenes showed signs of mental instability and his 
family imprisoned him in order to protect him and anyone 
coming in contact with him. Cleomenes managed to get a 
knife from one of his guards and in his madness cut 
himself into strips and in this manner committed suicide. 
The story seems suspect because there is little evidence 
which would indicate prior madness in Cleomenes' nature. 
For this reason it is likely that the ephors considered 
Cleomenes a political danger who had to be removed from 
public office. After removing him, the ephors then 
circulated the rumor of Cleomenes' madness and suicide. 
Ehrenberg says that Spartan kings with strong 
personalities like Cleomenes I would inevitably conflict 
8 
with the ephors. Cleomenes was ambitious and opposed to 
9 
the policy of isolationism which the ephors supported. 
Cleomenes' attempts to pursue his own policy resulted in 
7 
problems with the ephors and in his ultimate exile, which 
was also a result of Cleomenes' deposing Demaratus and 
increasing public disgruntlement over his policy in 
10 
Thessaly. 
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The successor of the exiled Demaratus Leotychidas had 
his problems with the Spartan commoners. He was brought 
to trial for accepting bribes from the Athenians around 
467. Leotychidas escaped condemnation by fleeing Sparta 
voluntarily for Tegea, but at home, the ephorate and the 
11 
gerousia together deposed him. 
Leotychidas' successor Archidamus II brought grave 
censure down on himself when he wasted time at Oenoe 
before setting off to attack Athens early in the 
12 
Peloponnesian War. He injured himself in "the public 
estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the 
slowness with which the rest of the march had been 
13 
conducted." 
In 445, the ephorate and gerousia exiled the king 
Pleistoanax who was the son of Pausanias (the regent to 
Pleistarchos). They exiled Pleistoanax, because it was 
popularly believed that the Athenians had bribed him to 
14 
retreat from Attica. Thucydides reports that 
Pleistoanax was later accused of having bribed the 
priestess of Delphi in order to get himself restored to 
15 
his former position in Sparta. After the death of King 
Archidamus, in 426, Pleistoanax returned to Sparta, but 
some of the people blamed Spartan misfortunes in the 
Peloponnesian War on Pleistoanax•s unconstitutional 
16 
recall. 
Upon the Spartan army's return from Argos around the 
80 
418, the Lacedaemonians blamed King Agis II for not having 
17 
subdued that city-state. There were those commoners who 
wanted Agis fined and his home destroyed. Agis made a 
public appeal and promised to do better. The Spartiates 
decided to take no immediate action against the king, but 
did assign ten Spartan counsellors to him. He then needed 
18 
their consent to lead an army from Sparta. 
King Pausanias was the leader of one of three Spartan 
political factions during the latter part of the 
Peloponnesian War and during the Spartan hegemony; 
Lysander and Agesilaus led the other two factions. In 
403, upon his return from a inconclusive battle, 
19 
Pausanias• enemies managed to bring him to trial. He 
was cleared of the charges leveled against him for not 
taking proper opportunities in the battlefield and making 
something of them. In 395, after Lysander's death, 
Pausanias was again brought to trial and charged with 
deliberately being slow to join Lysander's forces. In 
effect, the commoners accused the king of causing 
20 
Lysander's death through his (Pausanias•) slowness. 
Pausanias must have realized that popular sentiment was 
against him as he fled Sparta for Tegea without waiting to 
21 
stand trial. Rice indicates that the outbreak of the 
Corinthian War caused the policies of Pausanias to be 
22 
discredited and resulted in his trial and exile. The 
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trial held during Pausanias' absence resulted in his being 
23 
condemned to death. Yet even his exile Pausanias 
continued to attack the ephorate and urge a reform of the 
Spartan political system which would decrease the powers 
24 
of the ephors. 
The ephors often played one king against the other. 
In this manner the ephors derived much of their power from 
25 
animosity between two kings. When the two kings agreed 
the ephors could not control the situation as they 
26 
wanted. Some kings worked within the system and 
appeared to go along with the requirements of the ephors 
and other Spartan authorities. One such king was 
Agesilaus. As soon as he had received a request from the 
27 
government at home he obeyed it. Although Agesilaus may 
have had his conflicts with Lysander and Antalcidas he was 
a well liked king because of his apparent subservience to 
the various parts of the Spartan government. Through his 
submissive attitude Agesilaus was able to increase his own 
influence and power without the awareness of the ephorate 
28 
and gerousia. 
The conflict between Agesilaus and Lysander resulted 
from the exaltation of Lysander by his friends and many of 
the allies. People paid court to Lysander as though he 
were the one with all the power, the actual ruler, while 
29 
Agesilaus was just a figurehead king. While this might 
82 
have worked well with the navarchs who had the title while 
Lysander had the power, Agesilaus strongly objected to 
being second. The king began to do just the opposite of 
what Lysander wanted, and did not help those people who 
30 
had put their confidence in Lysander. Lysander soon 
realized what Agesilaus was doing and began to advise 
31 
those seeking his help to turn to the king instead. 
Agesilaus had the ability to turn things to his own 
benefit. He knew just how far to push his advantage and 
when to appear meek. Agesilaus• image , however, became 
tarnished when the Theban Epaminondas gained control of 
Messenia and its former citizens (the majority of Sparta's 
helot population) flocked to the reestablished country. 
The Spartiates resented Agesilaus because Messenia was 
32 
lost during his reign. Agesilaus lost Sparta's entire 
empire along with its supremacy on land and sea to 
33 
Thebes. Plutarch says that Agesilaus lost even his 
great reputation when he offered to be a mercenary 
34 
commander under the Egyptian Tachos. 
Conflicts between the kings and the ephors resulted 
from disagreements on policy to be followed. Most of the 
kings tended to yield to the ephors or else the king faced 
trial and possible exile. The ancient sources cite 
several instances of the actual removal of kings from 
their position as happened to Leotychidas (476) and 
Pausanias (395) but there are not any references to ephors 
35 
being brought up on charges. Many modern scholars argue 
that the kings were most likely to have the greatest 
influence on Spartan politics, since they held their 
36 
positions for life. These scholars say that the ephors 
could not have much influence on politics as they held 
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their offices for one year only and could not gain much of 
37 
a following. While it is true that the ephorate was a 
one year elective office, because it was a popularly 
elected office, the men who became ephors could not have 
gained the position without some amount of support from 
38 
the general masses of Spartiates. This popular support 
enabled the ephor to be certain that there was indeed some 
amount of agreement with his policy. Popular support also 
compelled the ephors to be more responsive to the public 
than the king was. Thus the ephors were responsible to 
their constituents and as such had to perform as the 
Spartiates commanded. 
Rice states that men who controlled the ephorate 
controlled foreign policy in Sparta such as Agesilaus did 
39 
during his siege of Philus. Ehrenberg says that the 
only rivals to the ephors were some of the kings, more of 
these kings being Agiad than Eurypontid seemingly because 
more Agiad kings had stronger personalities than their 
40 
Eurypontid counterparts. The ephors knew how to turn 
the kings against one another and thus prevent their 
41 
uniting together to control Spartan policy. Hornblower 
asserts that the way in which Sparta conducted her wars 
and her foreign policy left much to chance and personal 
42 
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axe-grinding. These scholars imply that there were many 
ways of controlling the Spartan political scene and no set 
pattern existed. 
M. I. Finley states that conflicts were not so much 
between kings and ephors as between men of ambition and 
43 
power. Andrews as well says that the struggles between 
ephorate and monarchy were not the formative blocks of 
44 
Spartan history. He believes that in the reigns of 
strong kings like Cleomenes I and Agesilaus II there were 
few conflicts involving ephors and kings. Rather, under 
strong kings the ephorate gave way to the king's 
45 
aspirations. 
Dickins argues that beginning around 550 the issue of 
strife between the ephors and the kings dominated Sparta's 
political development and that these struggles continued 
to guide and influence political matters for the whole of 
46 
Spartan history. It does appear probable that conflicts 
between ephors and kings resulted in the victors directing 
the development of Spartan politics. These types of 
conflicts were not the sole determinants of Sparta 
politics or history. In addition to conflict between 
kings and ephorate there were the struggles between kings 
themselves and those between individual commoners, who 
were not ephors, and the kings. Dickins also states that 
there were boards of solid anti-monarchical ephors each 
year during the reign of Cleomenes I and the regency of 
47 
Pausanias for the young king Pleistarchos. This 
assumption on the part of Dickins is also open to debate, 
for it is virtually impossible that a group of five men 
popularly elected year after year would be against the 
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policy of the king unless the a majority of the population 
of commoners similarly objected to the king's activities. 
The commoners, because of the high government 
positions they could possess, were able to take measures 
against many of the Spartan kings with whose policies the 
commoners disagreed. As popularly elected officials the 
ephors were unlikely to take any measures against popular 
kings or those whose policies found favor with the Spartan 
citizens as a group. To have advanced against a popular 
king would have resulted in the ephors being brought to 
trial for their actions after serving the year's term. 
Since the primary source materials do not record any such 
action against an ephor it is probable that when the 
ephors and gerousia deposed or exiled kings they were 
acting under the auspices of the people or at least were 
able to convince the Spartan people of the validity of the 
actions of the two groups against the king. In the 
conflicts between kings and commoners the importance and 
influence of commoners was important especially in regards 
to who actually prevailed in determining Spartan policy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Sparta and her commoners became known for their 
austerity and militarism. Emphasis was placed on the 
achievements of the kings of Sparta and the efforts of the 
Spartan commoners dismissed. But the commoners were an 
important group within Sparta without whose efforts the 
polis could not have gained such prestige and power in the 
Peloponnese and eventually in all of Greece. 
References to the activitites occurring in Sparta 
after her loss at Leuctra in 371, are few in number. Few 
individual Spartan commoners are known and the lists of 
kings and their reigns are uncertain. Diodorus mentions 
Peloponnesian mercenaries helping to liberate Syracuse 
1 
around 356. The Spartans were involved in the Sacred War 
2 
which began in 355 and participated in a revolt against 
3 
Alexander the Great of Macedon in 331. Little more is 
known of Spartan history until the coming of the Romans to 
Greece. The city-state which had defeated the great polis 
Athens in 404 was no longer of primary importance. 
The Lycurgan reforms and Spartan constitution 
suppressed artistic endeavors which resulted in no 
Spartan literary achievements other than those of a 
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political nature. The sources for Spartan history are 
limited to non-Spartan writers, several of whom were 
not contemporary to the events of which they wrote. In 
these primary materials the kings figured prominently. 
Yet within the sources were the details which indicate 
the importance of the commoners to Sparta. 
The Spartan commoners constituted the smallest of 
the three major classifications of Laconian peoples 
the Spartiates. Although few in number, and shrinking 
decreasing in number between 776 and 323, the 
Spartiates governed Sparta. The decline in the 
population of the Spartiates was a direct result of the 
actions of the citizens themselves. The accumulation 
of property and wealth in the hands of fewer commoners 
resulted in the commoners practicing a type of birth 
control whereby they produced few children who would 
share in their parents' material possessions. Land 
accumulation also resulted in the loss of citizenship 
by certain commoners who were unable to pay their mess 
bills or otherwise became heavily indebted. Because it 
was nearly impossible for a Lacedaemonian to move up 
into the citizen class of Spartans, a limited Spartiate 
population base resulted which, in turn, helped to 
cause a decline in the numbers of the commoners. 
The pereoicoi and helots were important to Sparta 
for their contributions to the military system, 
agricultural production, trade, and artistic endeavors. 
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Yet, the commoner•s fear of rebellion among the 
pereoicoi and especially the helots resulted in the 
ultra militarization of Sparta and her ci~lzens. The 
development of the agoge and the syssitia were a direct 
manifestation of the increased military nature of the 
Spartan commoners. All Spartan commoners were in the 
main subjugated to the state and had little 
individuality. 
The Spartan commoners were active in all phases of 
the government of the state except for the monarchy. 
As navarchs they controlled the command of the Spartan 
forces at sea. The assembly voted on the laws and 
elected non-appointed officials. Between the gerousia 
and the ephorate no phase of judical responsiblity was 
omitted from the control of the commoners. These two 
groups also directly influenced most of the political 
activities of the Spartan state both at home and 
abroad. Together the ephorate and gerousia were 
empowered to try and depose the kings of Sparta. The 
kings were mere figureheads of the government and only 
ruled in the field of battle, but even there they were 
under the watchful eyes of the ephors. 
In quarrels with the kings, the commoners proved 
that they would not yield to their kings, but would 
follow a different policy especially when the majority 
of Spartan commoners agreed to differ with the king. 
Individual commoners such as Chilon, Brasidas, and 
91 
Lysander proved to what heights the commoners could 
reach within the Spartan governmental structure, 
military system, and foreign political activities. 
The Spartan commoners were the "backbone" of the 
Spartan state. Without their energy and influence the 
history of Sparta is only partial. The kings and 
heroes were not the only elements involved in the 
making of Sparta and the commoner must be remembered. 
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